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1. Introduction 
“The internet can be regarded as the most complex machine mankind ever built. We barely 
understand how it works, let alone how to secure it” [Schneier 2008]. The introduction of 
new technologies like the proliferation of new web applications or the increasing use of 
wireless, have exacerbated this fact. Cybersecurity, a spin-off of the phenomenal growth of 
the internet, has probably become the most complex threat to modern societies. The 
development of cybersecurity has been reactive and driven by the ingeniosity and 
imagination of cyberattackers. In the words of Carl Landwehr in IEEE security and Privacy 
(Landwehr 2008), "defense has consisted in “fixing the plumbing”. What we need is to put 
more Artificial Intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity". This is the theme of this chapter. 
Cyberspace is a rather brittle infrastructure, not designed to support what it does today, and 
on which more and more functionality is build. The fact that the internet is used for all sorts 
of critical activities at the level of individuals, firms, organizations and even at the level of 
nations has attracted all sorts of malicious activities. Cyber-attacks can take all sorts of 
forms. Some attacks like Denial of Service are easy to detect. The problem is what to do 
against them. For many other forms of attack, detection is a problem and sometimes the 
main problem. 
The art of cyber-attack never stops improving. The Conficker worm or malware (which was 
unleashed in Fall 2008 and is still infecting millions of computers worldwide two years later) 
ushered us in an era of higher sophistication. As far as detection goes, Conficker in a sense 
was  not difficult to detect as it spreads generously and infected many honeypots.  But as is 
the case for any other new malware, there are no existing tool which would automatically 
detect it and protect users. In the case of Conficker, the situation is worse in the sense that 
being a dll malware, direct detection and removal of the malware in compromise computers 
is problematic. One additional problem with Conficker is the sophistication of the code 
(which has been studied and reverse engineered ad nauseam) and of the malware itself (it 
had many functionality, was using encryption techniques to communicate (MD6) which had 
never been used before). It spreads generously worldwide using a variety of vectors, within 
networks,  into a variety of military organizations, hospitals etc…).  In fact the challenge 
became such that the security industry made the unprecedented move of joining forces in a 
group called the Conficker working group. The only indication that this approach met with 
some  success is that even if the botnet that Conficker build involves millions of infected 
computers, that botnet does not seem to have been used into any attack, at least not yet.... 
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Conficker is only but one evidence that cyber-attackers have reached a level of 
sophistication and expertise such that they can routinely build malware specifically for 
some targeted attacks (against private networks for example), i.e. malware that are not mere 
variations of a previous one. Existing tools do not provide any protection against that kind 
of threat and do not have the potential to do so. What is needed are tools which detect 
autonomously new attacks against specific targets, networks or even individual computers. 
I.e. what is needed are intelligent tools. Defense based on reactively protecting against the 
possibility of a re-use of a malware or repeat of a type of attack (which is what we are doing 
today) is simply inadequate. 
With the advent of the web, the “threat spectrum” has broadened considerably. A lot of 
critical activity takes place through web application. HTML, HTTP, JavaScript among others 
offer many points of entry for malicious activity through many forms of code injections. 
Trusted sessions between a user and a bank for example can be compromised or hijacked in 
a variety of ways.  
The security response against those new threats is tentative and suboptimal. It is tentative in 
the sense that new attacks are discovered regularly and we are far from having a clear 
picture of threat spectrum on web application. It is suboptimal in the sense that the 
"response" typically consists in limiting functionality (through measure such as “same origin 
policy”, for example), or complicating and making more cumbersome the protocol of 
trusted session in different ways. The beauty and attraction of the web stem from those 
functionalities. This approach to security potentially stifles the drive for innovations, which 
underlie the progress of the internet. 
Cybersecurity is a challenge, which calls for a more sophisticated answer than is the case 
today. In this chapter, we focus on intrusion detection. But there is a role for Artificial 
Intelligence practically everywhere in cybersecurity,  
The aspect of the problem that Intrusion Detection addresses is to alert users or networks 
that they are under attack or as is the case with web application may not even involve any 
malware but is based on abusing a protocol. What kind of attributes should an Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) have to provide that kind of protection? It should be intelligent, 
hence the interest in AI. 
The idea of using AI in intrusion detection is not new. In fact it is, now decades old, i.e. 
almost as old as the field of intrusion detection. Still today AI is not used intensely in 
intrusion detection. That AI could potentially improve radically the performance of IDS is 
obvious, but what is less obvious is how to operationalize this idea. There are several 
reasons for that. The most important one is that AI is a difficult subject, far from mature and 
only security people seem to be interested in using AI in intrusion detection. People 
involved in AI seem much more interested in other applications, although in many ways 
cybersecurity should be a natural domain of application for AI. The problem may lie more 
with cybersecurity than the AI community. Cybersecurity projects the impression of a 
chaotic world devoid of coherence and lacking codification. 
As a result of that situation, most of the attempts to introduce AI in intrusion detection 
consisted in trying to apply existing tools developed or used in AI to cybersecurity. But in 
AI tools tend to be developed around applications and optimized for them. There are no AI 
tools optimized for cybersecurity. AI is a vast field which goes from the rather "primitive" to 
the very sophisticated. Many AI related attempts to use AI in cybersecurity, were in fact 
using the more basic tools. More recently there has been interest in the more sophisticated 
approaches like knowledge base approach to AI.  
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In the spirit of the Turing test (Turing 1950), it is tempting to define what an AI based 
intrusion detector should accomplish, is  to replicate as well as possible what a human 
expert would do. Said otherwise, if a human expert with the same information as an IDS is 
able to detect that something anomalous/ malicious is taking place, there is hope that an AI 
based system could do the job. Since cyber attacks necessarily differ somehow from 
legitimate activities, this suggest that an AI based detector should be also an anomaly-based 
detector, whatever one means by "anomaly" (we elaborate on that later in this chapter). A 
closer look at the comparison between human beings and machine suggests that there are 
irreducible differences between the two which translate in differences in the limit of their 
performance. Human beings learn faster and "reason" better. But those differences do not go 
only in favor of the human: machines compute faster and better... 
Today’s AI based IDS’s are very far from the kind of level of performance that makes such 
comparisons relevant. To provide adequate protection to the increasing level of 
functionality and complexity that is happening in the internet, the AI systems involved in 
cybersecurity of the future would have to be hugely more sophisticated than anything we 
can imagine today, to the point of raising the issue of what size they would have and the 
amount of CPU they would need. Is it possible to conceive a future cyberworld where so 
much artificial intelligence could coexist with so much functionality without suffocating it? 
The answer has to be yes. The alternative would be tantamount to assume before trying that 
AI will be at best a small part of cybersecurity. Where would the rest, the bulk of 
cybersecurity come from? 
In fact there is a precedent: the immune system. The immune system co-evolved with the 
rest of biological evolution to become a dual use (huge) organ in our body. There are as 
many immune cells in our body as nervous cells (~1012). The human body is constantly 
“visited” by thousands of “antigens” (the biological equivalent of malware) and the immune 
system is able to discriminate between what is dangerous or not with a high degree of 
accuracy.  In the same way one could envision in the long run computers being provided 
with a “cyber-immune system” which would autonomously acquire a sense of situational 
awareness from which it could protect the users. This is at best a vision for the long run. In 
the short run, more modest steps have to be made. 
The first detection of any attack is anomaly-based. Today most if not all of the time the 
anomaly-based detector is a human being. The interest in anomaly-based detection by 
machines has an history which overlaps the history of attempts of introducing AI in 
cybersecurity. In fact most of the attempts to introduce AI in intrusion detection was in the 
context of anomaly-based detection.  
Basically all new attacks are detected through anomalies, and in most cases they are 
detected by human beings. Considering the variety of forms that attacks can take, it is rather 
obvious that anomalies can take all sorts of forms. Anomaly based Intrusion Detection has 
been a subject of research for decades.. If it has failed to deliver a widely used product, this 
is not for lack of imagination of where to look to find anomalies. One of the most promising 
attempts, which had an inspirational effect on the research in that field, was to use system 
calls. 
The nemesis of anomaly-based detection has been the false positive. A detection system 
cannot be perfect (even if it uses a human expert). It produces false positive (it thinks it has 
detected a malicious event, which in fact is legitimate) and has false negative (it fails to 
detect actual malicious events). Often there is a trade-off between the two: when one puts 
the threshold very low to avoid false negative, one often ends up with a higher rate of false 
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positive. If a detector has a false positive probability of 1%, this does not imply that if it 
raises a flag it will be a false alert only 1% of the time (and 99% probability that it detected 
an actual malicious event). It means that when it analyzes random legitimate events 1% of 
the time it will raise a flag. If the detector analysis 10,000 events, it will flag 100 legitimate 
events. If out of the 10,000 events one was malicious, it will raise an additional flag, making 
its total 101.Out of the 101 events detected, 1 was malicious and 100 were legitimate.  In 
other words, out of the 101 alerts only one is real and 100 out of 101, i.e. more than 99% of 
the time the alert was a false positive. 
Those numbers were illustrative but taken totally by chance. 1% is a typical performance for 
"good" anomaly based detection systems thus far proposed. The actual frequency of 
malicious activity in the traffic (if one neglects spam) is not precisely known, but malicious 
events are relatively rare. I.e. they represent between 0 and maybe 10-4 of the traffic. Before 
anomaly-based detection can be considered operational, one has to find ways to reduce the 
probability of false positive by orders of magnitude. It is fair to say that we are at a stage 
where a new idea in anomaly-based intrusion detection, inspired by AI or anything else, 
lives or dies on its potential to put the false positive under control. In this chapter, two 
algorithms or mechanisms are offered which can reduce the probability of false positives to 
that extent: one uses Bayesian updating, the other generalizing an old idea of von Neumann 
(von Neumann 1956) to the analysis of events by many detectors.  
 Those two algorithms represent the "original" or technical contributions of this chapter, but 
this chapter is also concerned more generally by the interface between AI and cybersecurity 
and discusses ways in which this interface could be made more active. 
2. Framing the problem  
a. The new Threat environment 
The “threat environment” has evolved as has the art of cyber-attack. Buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities have been known for a long time - the Morris worm of 1988, that for many 
was the real beginning of cybersecurity, exploited a buffer overflow vulnerabilities. They 
became a real preoccupation a few years later and progressively people realize that most 
software written in C have exploitable buffer overflow vulnerabilities.  
Buffer overflows are still around today. Although they have not been "solved" they now 
represent only one class in what has become a zoology of exploitable vulnerabilities. In most 
cases after those vulnerabilities are discovered, the vendor produces a patch, which is 
reverse engineered by hackers and an exploit is produced within hours of the release of the 
patch… Many well-known malware (Conficker is an example) exploit vulnerabilities for 
which there is a patch. They use the fact that for a variety of reasons, the patch is not 
deployed in vulnerable - of such attacks, where the attacker discovers the vulnerability 
before the vendor and susceptible computers are helpless. The attack in the fall 2009 against 
Google and a few more companies originating in China, called Aurora, was an example of 
an exploitable dangling pointers vulnerability in a Microsoft browser, that had not been 
discovered yet.  
A good defense strategy should rely on the ability of anticipating attacks and produce 
patches in time. A really good defense system should be able to protect computers from the 
exploitation of yet undiscovered exploitable vulnerability. 
With advent of the web new classes of vulnerabilities emerge. Some websites are not 
immune against code injection, which can have all sorts of implications. Some website are 
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vulnerable to Java-script instructions. This can be used for a variety of purpose, one being to 
compromise the website and makes its access dangerous to users. Protecting websites 
against all forms of code injection is easy in the case where it does not involve a lot of 
functionality. But interactive websites providing a lot of functionality are far more difficult 
to protect against every possible scenario of attack. 
In the case of web application security, the Browser plays a central role. The interaction 
between users and severs go through the Browser, which in principle sees everything. In 
practice browsers have some security embedded in them, but not of the kind that could alert 
the user that he is victim of a cross site request forgery (CSRF) attack, for example.  A really 
good defense system would be able to achieve a degree of situational awareness of what is 
taking place within the browser to detect that kind of attack and other forms of attack.  
b. What are anomalies 
The concept of anomalies is problematic, as is their relation with malicious activities (Tan 
and Maxion, 2005). By definition an anomaly is a “rare event”, in other words, the concept 
of anomaly is statistical in nature. A noteworthy attempt to define anomaly was the idea of 
S. Forrest et al to make statistics of system calls (Hofmeyr et al. 1998). The idea was inspired 
by the concept of self and non-self ion immunology. The building blocks of proteins and 
antigens are amino acids. There are about 20 of them, some more essential than others. This 
means that there is an enormous variety of sequence of amino acids. Antigens are 
recognized by the immune systems as “non-self”, i.e. having sequences that are not 
represented in the body. In principle the immune system attacks only the tissues which are 
non-self (This is what happens in the rejection of transplants). Auto-immune diseases would 
represent the “false positive” and they are relatively very rare. What is remarkable is that 
the distinction self non-self in immunology is based on short sequences (typically 9) of 
amino acids, called peptides.  
The idea is that users can be recognized by the statistics of system calls, and that the 
equivalent of peptides would be short set of successive system calls. The number six (Tan 
and Maxion 2002) turned out to be “optimum”. In that approach one can choose to define 
what is “anomalous”, through its frequency of occurrence: 1%, 0.1%, .. The connection 
between abnormality and maliciousness is based on assumptions.  
One advantage of this approach is that every user is supposed to be different. That puts 
potential attackers in situation of added complexity as it is difficult for them to fool many 
users with the same attack at the same time. 
Among the other obstacles in using this approach is the fact that users change habits, the 
concept of what is normal is not constant. and that can potentially be exploited through so-
called "mimicry attacks", i.e. manipulation of the concept of normality by a shrewd attacker. 
The fact that in modern computers there is a lot of activity taking place in the background, 
out of the control of the user introduces an additional noise. Furthermore that kind of 
approach has limited use for web security. In the context of web applications, the 
information to analyze statistically is buried in the set of HTTP requests that reach and are 
conveyed by the browser.  
3. Review of previous relevant work 
One can find many papers dealing with intrusion detection and using the word "AI" in their 
title. By AI, often is meant data mining, neural network, fuzzy logic (Idris et al 2005), 
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Hidden Markov Model (Choy and Cho, 2001), self-organizing maps and the like.  
Considering that all these papers deal with anomaly-based intrusion detection, the key 
figure of merit to gauge their contribution is whether their approach has the potential to 
tame the false positives. Those papers are remotely related to this chapter, as the problem of 
false positives is not as central and unlike this chapter, in those papers the machine learning 
and Knowledge base aspects of AI are not as prominent as in the discussion of this chapter.   
A lot but not all of the AI "machinery" is statistical (Mitchell 1997) in nature (and therefore is 
threatened by the curse of the false positives... There is branch of AI concerned by 
"reasoning" (Brachman et al. 2004, Bacchus et al 1999, Baral et al. 2000), making context 
dependent decision and the like. Among the papers dealing with AI in the context of 
intrusion detection, the paper of Gagnon and Esfandiari 2007 is probably the closest to this 
chapter. Its discussion is in fact less general than this chapter and is organized around a very 
specific use of a Knowledge based approach to AI. The discussion illustrates the challenges 
in trying to use sophisticated AI techniques in cybersecurity.   
4. Reducing the false positives using Bayesian updating 
As stated in the introduction the nemesis of anomaly based IDS systems is the probability of 
false positive. When the probability that an event is malicious does not exceed 10-4, the 
probability of false positive should be less than that. 
Little or no thought has been put in exploiting the fact that a cyber-attack is in general a 
protracted affair. In the same way that a human expert monitoring an suspicious events 
would see whether the evidence that what he is witnessing is indeed an attack or not, an IDS 
system could make a more protracted analysis of suspicion before raising a flag, thereby 
reducing the probability of false positive. 
We sketch here how the math of such an iterated procedure would work, starting by 
spending some time defining what false positive means. It can mean more than one thing... 
Let the Boolean variable ζ  refer to whether one deals with a malicious event or not. By 
definition: 1ζ =  means that the event is malicious. Otherwise 0ζ = . The variable of 
interest is: ( )1P ζ = , the probability that it was a malicious event. All the paraphernalia of 
data, measurements and detection, can be represented by another Boolean variable X. By 
definition X = 1 means that there is evidence for something malicious, i.e. something 
abnormal. 
The famous Bayes theorem states that: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1, 0 1| 0 0 0| 1 1P X P X P P X P Xζ ζ ζ ζ= = = = = = = = = =  (1) 
 
In EQ1 there are three probabilities, which can be referred to as "false positive", but should 
be distinguished:  
( )1, 0P X ζ= =  is the probability that, an attack is being detected while in fact no attack took 
place.   
( )1| 0P X ζ= =  is the conditional probability that even if there is no attack, the system of 
detection will detect one.  
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( )0| 1P Xζ = =  is the conditional probability that when there is evidence of an attack, in 
fact this is a false alert. 
From EQ 1, it is clear that they are three different numbers.  
The conditional probabilities ( )1| 0P X ζ= =  and ( )0| 1P X ζ= =  are figures of merit of the 
detection system. They determined whether or not the information generated by the 
detection system should be used or not. The number of interest is:  that an attack is taking 
place.  
What is referred to as “false positive” in this chapter is ( )1| 0P X ζ= = , i.e. it is an attribute 
of the detection system. In the same way ( )0| 1P X ζ= =  represents the false negative, also 
an attribute of the detection system 
One can then use the fundamental assumption underlying the so-called “Bayesian 
updating”: if at a given time the probability that there is a malicious event is  ( )1P ζ = , then 
after a new measurement where X is either 1 or 0, the new value of  ( )1P ζ =  is: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 1 1 0p X p X X p Xζ ζ ζ= = = = + − = =#  (2) 
 
In order to have this expression in terms of “false positive” and false negative” , we rewrite 
EQ. 2, using EQ.1, as: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )11
1|1
0
1|01
1
~ =
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=
==+=
==−== ζζζζ P
XP
XPX
XP
XPX
P
 
(3) 
 ( )1Pϑ ζ= =  is a dynamical variable. Each time a measurement is made, the value of ( )1Pϑ ζ= =  is updated into ϑ# : 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 0| 1
0| 1 1 0| 0
1| 1
1| 1 1 1| 0
X P X
P X P X
X P X
P X P X
ζϑ
ϑ ϑ ζ ϑ ζ
ζ
ϑ ζ ϑ ζ
− = == += = + − = =
= =+ = = + − = =
#
 (4) 
 
To show the potential power of using Bayesian updating, let assume that as a prior we take 
( ) 41 10Pϑ ζ −= = ≈ . We also assume that the detection system has 1% false positive 
( ( )1 0 0.01P X ζ= = = ), we also assume that ( )1 1 0.99P X ζ= = = , and consistently in EQ.4 
each measurement is suspicious, i.e: 1X = . The evolution of the value of  ( )1Pϑ ζ= =   is 
shown in Figure 1.  It takes 4 successive evidences of suspicion to put the probability that 
there is a malicious activity close to 1. The probability that the detector will make 4 mistakes 
in a row (if there is no correlation) is ( )42 810 10− −= . 
The possibility of using Bayesian updating in the context of anomaly-based detection has 
not yet been seriously contemplated. This is only one avenue toward making an AI based 
systems much less prone to false positives.  Another is using several computers networked 
together. 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of ( )1P ζ =  through Bayesian updating, using EQ.4 starting at ( ) 41 10P ζ −= = , assuming ( )1 0 0.01P X ζ= = =  and  ( )1 1 0.99P X ζ= = =  and assuming 
that at each measurement 1X =  . 
5.  Reducing the false positives using networked computers 
 Another avenue, which offers a lot of promises too, is using the observation that what one 
computer may have difficulty to do, several computers networked intelligently could.  
John von Neumann (von Neumann 1956) wrote a paper entitled “Probabilistic logics and the 
synthesis of reliable organisms from unreliable components”, which supports this notion. 
The paper, which culminated several years of study was not about anomaly-based intrusion 
detection, but understanding how the brain works. The goal was to sow how a logical 
system can perform better than its component and thereby establish some foundations for 
AI. 
A way to interpret some of the results of von Neumann is that it is possible if one has a 
system involving a large number of components, to combine the components in such a way 
that they build a kind of information processor such that the resulting uncertainty on the 
outcome can in principle be made arbitrarily small if the number of components can be large 
enough.  
Ostensibly the paper of John von Neumann (von Neumann 1956), addresses the question of 
how to reduce the error due to unreliable components to an arbitrary small level using 
multiplexing and large numbers. In practice, the ideas developed in that paper have the 
potential to be applied to a large variety of problems involving unreliable components and 
we think among others the problem of early detection of new malware. Here we described 
succinctly some relevant observations of von Neumann. 
a. Logical 3- gates 
A majority rule 3-gate receives information from three sources. The probability that the gate 
yields a false information is the probability that at least two of the three sources were 
providing a false information. If iχ  is the probability that line “i” gives a false positive, the 
probability that at least two of the three incoming lines give a wrong information and that 
the gate is sending a false positive signal is:  
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 1 3 2 2 3 1 1 2 31 1 1gπ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ= − + − + − +  (1) 
Or equivalently: 
 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 32gπ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ χ= + + −  (2) 
If one assumes that 10%iχ ≈ , then the probability of false positive of the system made of 
three detectors, feeding on a majority 3-gate will be 3%gπ ≈  (Cf Figure 2).  
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0.4
0.6
0.8
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Fig. 2. Output of majority rule gates: The green curve is for the case with three detectors 
assuming that: 1 2 3χ χ χ ξ= = = , i.e. that: 2 33 2gπ ξ ξ= − . In that case: 3 2 33 2FPπ ξ ξ= − .  The 
two other curves are for the case where there are nine detectors. The red curve corresponds 
to the simple majority rule 9MRπ , the other one (blue) corresponds to the case where the nine 
detectors are distributed in three majority 3 rules feeding a majority 3 rule. I.e. it 
corresponds to: 9FPπ . 
b. With 3 N computers Logical 3-gates 
Grouping the signal emanating from detectors in three and make them feed a majority rule 
gate would produce an aggregate with a somewhat improved probability of false positive 
(and this can be used for the false negative too).  
For illustration let us assume that the number of detectors is nine, In the first scenario 
(construct of majority 3-gates), the probability 9FPπ of false positive that nine computers 
(each with the same probability of false positive ξ ) feeding three majority rule gates (each 
gate has a false positive probability 3 2 33 2FPπ ξ ξ= − ), is therefore: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }2 3 29 3 3 2 3 2 33 2 3 2 3 2 3 2FP FP FPπ π π ξ ξ ξ ξ= − = − − −  (3) 
The generalization of this formula to the case of 3N detectors is: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )2 33 1 3 13 3 2N NNFP FP FPπ π π− −= −  (4) 
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The speed at which the false positive rate decreases when N grows is shown in Table 1, 
where the individual probability of false positive is assumed to be 10% ( 0.1ξ = ). What in 
table 1 is referred to as N=27 in EQ. 4 would correspond to 3N=27, i.e. N=9.Table 1 
compares the situation of computers distributed into networked 3 gates, with the scenario 
where they build one logical N gates. 
c. Logical N-gates 
 In this scenario (one majority rule gate), the probability of false positive NMRπ  has the 
general form: 
 ( )
2
1
N
N iN i
MR
N
i
N
i
π ξ ξ −
>
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑   (4) 
In that scenario the overall probability of false positive decreases with N even faster than in 
the scenario of the networked 3-gates, as illustrated in Table 1.  
When the number of computers increases, the improvement increases as well and it 
increases fast, in particular in the majority rule case. For example for 0.1ξ = : 
 
 
           ( )
1
2
1
N
N iN i
MR
N
i
N
i
π ξ ξ −
= +
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
2 3
3 33 2
N N
N
FP FP FPπ π π
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
N=3 0.028 0.028 
N=9 0.00089 0.0023 
N=27 5.6 x 10-8 0.0000159 
N=81 3.5 x 10--20 7.6 x 10-10 
Set-up Majority rule 3-gates 
 
Those results assume that the probabilities of false positive of the different detectors are 
independent. This is clearly not always the case. This idea inspired from von Neumann 
could benefit significantly anomaly-based network intrusion detection.  
d. Operationalizing such ideas and the need for more AI 
If one could exploit the full implications of Bayesian updating and/or when possible use 
logical N-Gates, the fact that anomaly-based detection generate intrinsically too many false 
positive, would not constitute an insuperable obstacle to build a full anomaly-based system.  
Logical N-gates and network security: 
The multi computer approach inspired from von Neumann would be appropriate for 
network intrusion detection. If several computers detect anomalies simultaneously and they 
are appropriately connected, this could lead to a powerful system of detection with few false 
positives and few false negatives at the same time.  
Ghostnet (and its follow up "Shadows  in the Cloud") refers to  a Trojans which penetrated 
several networks associated with government agencies, most notoriously the network of the 
Dalai Lama in 2008 and of Indian agencies involved in national Security in 2009/2010. In 
both cases it was traced back to China. Ghostnet was eventually discovered when the Dalai 
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Lama began to suspect that his network must have been penetrated by the Chinese and 
asked infowar in the university of Toronto to investigate. Using honeypot they uncovered 
the presence of a Trojan, which was spying on the e-mails and reporting to servers scattered 
in the world. The investigation established that the compound of the Dalai Lama was only 
one of several networks that had been penetrated. A close monitoring of the traffic coming 
in and out of the network, by the computers of the networks, could have detected some 
suspicious queries. But the probability that those suspicious queries were false positive 
would have been large. If the evidence of those suspicions had been sent to a centralized 
server, by an algorithm similar to the logic N-gates scenario, it may have been able to 
establish the suspicion with far more certainty, much earlier. 
The same kind of argument can be made about malware like Agent.btz which 
“traumatized” the US military and malware like Silent Banker that roam in the networks of 
Banks. In each case an individual computer would not be able to do a very good job at 
detecting a malicious activity with high level of certainty. But those malware do not infect 
only one computer. They need to infect quite a few, which therefore could cooperate to 
establish the presence of the malware. 
Operationalizing Bayesian updating: 
Bayesian updating is somewhat reminiscent of the implications of the observation that if one 
uses more than one measurement, the two best measurements may not be the best two  
(Cover 1970). A way to operationalize the Bayesian updating technique would be for 
example through a tool making periodic assessments of whether a sequence of events 
involves an increasing number of evidences that it is suspicious or not. For example, the tool 
could be embedded in the Browser of a client monitoring all the HTTP requests. If the tool 
detects suspicious activity it would trigger this updating procedure by analyzing 
subsequent events and see whether the suspicion tends to increase or not.  
Ideally the tool would be designed in such a way that it would be able to "reason" about 
those events and analyze them.  The important part here is that the tool would use a 
protracted analysis of the event to reach a decision about the event. Its reasoning would be 
probabilistic, but not necessarily statistically based. 
6. Web applications 
Although the web is only one aspect of the internet, web applications are becoming a 
dominant feature of the internet and this trend is growing. From the perspective of 
cybersecurity, the world of web applications is very complicated and seems to offer an infinite 
numbers of opportunities for abuse. Some exploitable vulnerabilities are difficult to 
understand or anticipate as they result from technical details of protocols, implementation of 
application or are consequences of abusing functionalities which otherwise are very useful or 
valuable (vanKesteren et al. 2008). Each time a new vulnerability is discovered, suggestions are 
made on how to avoid them (Barth et al. 2008b, Zeller and Felten 2008). Those suggestions are 
often not very attractive because they are based on reducing some functionality or they 
include adding complications in the implementation of applications. To the credit of system 
administrators, many of them spontaneously find ways to avoid potentially exploitable 
vulnerabilities. This is one reason why it is not so easy to find popular websites with obvious 
cross-site scripting (XSS) or cross site forgery request (CSRF) vulnerabilities (Zeller and Felten 
2008). On the other hand, new forms of attacks appear regularly (for example “ClickJacking” 
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(Grossman 2008), login CSRF (Barth et al. 2008) and more will appear. Still in the same way 
that the semantic web is based on the culture of AI, the new level of complexity of 
cybersecurity accompanying this development, would benefit from relying more on AI. 
a. The example of Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
In a CSRF attack, the attacker manages to pose as the legitimate user to a trusted website 
(Zeller and Felten 2008). CSRF is in fact not a new form of attack. In 1988 it was known as 
“confused deputy”.  For a long time it was a “sleeping giant” (Grossman 2006), which came 
to prominence only recently.  
CSRF can take many forms, some of them not so easy to understand. But a simple 
instantiation of CSRF would run the following way. A user has a trusted session (trust being 
guaranteed by cookies) with his bank website. If without having logged out from the 
session, the user goes to a malicious website and is induced to click on a link, a CSRF could 
occur. If HTTP request the user makes an HTTP Get request to the bank website, the 
browser of the user will make the query to the bank website. Since the cookies of the session 
are still active, the website will not be able to realize that the query technically originates 
from the malicious site and will execute it and it could be a instruction to transfer money 
from the account of the user. This is one (there are others) of the possible abuses of HTTP 
requests. This is an unfortunate consequence of what otherwise makes HTTP such a 
powerful protocol allowing a lot of functionalities in web applications. 
In order for the attack to be successful, not only should the user omit to log off from the 
trusted session with the bank, but the attacker should know all the coordinates of the bank 
and user. There are several ways to do that. One, which is simple to understand is if the 
website of the bank has been compromised in the first place by another form of popular web 
attack: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) (Foggie et al. 2007). Then the user can find himself been 
send to a spurious website and induce into But there are many other ways to lure a hapless 
user into going a malicious website or let an attacker hijack a trusted session. 
A few suggestions have been made for defense against CSRF, either on the server side 
(Zeller and Felten 2008) or on the user side  (for example RequestRodeo (Johns and Winter 
2006)).  But  “to be useful in practice, a mitigation technique for CSRF attacks has to satisfy 
two properties. First, it has to be effective in detecting and preventing CSRF attacks with a 
very low false negative and false positive rate. Second, it should be generic and spare web 
site administrators and programmers from application-specific modifications. Basically all 
the existing approaches fail in at least one of the two aspects” (Jovanovic et al. 2006). 
Would an expert monitoring each HTTP request and everything that goes through the 
browser always be able to realize that a CSRF attack is unfolding? The answer is not 
obvious. But it is safe to say that in most cases he would. That suggests that a AI-based 
defense system located within the browser could in principle also detect attacks. 
b. Web Application Firewalls (WAF) 
Firewalls have been part of the arsenal of cyberdefense for many years. The simplest and 
also the most reliable ones deny access based on port number.  The filtering can be more 
sophisticated, like being based on a deeper analysis of the incoming traffic, like deep packet 
inspection.  
Web applications firewalls (WAF) cannot rely on port number as most web applications use 
the same port as the rest of the web traffic, i.e. port 80. WAFs are supposed to tell the 
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difference between benign and malicious web applications. This has to be made through 
deep packet inspection.  
The idea of firewalls operating at the application layer is not new. They were introduced as 
“third generation” firewalls in the early 1990’s. They are used to protect data bases against 
SQL injections, for example. WAFs, are sometimes treated as a specialized form of 
application layer firewalls. WAFs began to enter the market at the end of the 90’s and 
tended to find their niche around specific applications. However sophisticated as they 
sometimes seem or are made to seem, as of today WAFs are not the reliable and performant 
tools that web security requires.  
WAFs are in a sense very illustrative of what this chapter is about: to become what 
cybersecurity requires, WAFs need more Artificial Intelligence. One reason WAFs progress 
so slowly is that putting AI in security tools in general and in WAFs in particular is difficult. 
AI tends to be developed around specific applications. Many areas of applications have 
inspired aggressive AI research. Cybersecurity is not one of them, at least not yet, although 
it seems a very natural area of application as it is about computers. Human beings are 
completely in control of the rules and protocol and they could be designed to facilitate the 
use of AI. 
7. Artificial Intelligence 
a. The need for a new paradigm for defense 
Instead of being adaptive, defense is purely reactive. In most cases it involves or essentially 
consists in limiting or foregoing some functionality. When a new attack has been 
discovered, more often than not the “security” solution consists in reducing the 
functionality. One major reason to turn toward AI, is to put an end at the present situation.  
The move from DNS to DNSSEC illustrates somewhat the problem with the present 
approach. It has improved the security of the internet. But the cost is a complicated system 
of keys, whose renewal opens the door for scenarios of failures, which did not exist before. 
With DNSSEC the internet is less vulnerable to malicious exploitations of the weaknesses of 
the DNS system, but the use of a cumbersome system of authentication for all the servers 
involved does not make it more reliable.  
The world of web applications is growing fast in importance and size, but in parallel it raises 
increasing concerns about security, which will not be solved adequately within the present 
paradigm of defense. 
Same Origin Policy (SOP) is another example of the “old-fashioned" approach to 
cybersecurity.  SOP (a policy adopted by most browsers) was designed to prevent the 
possibility that scripts originating from other than one site can be run on a web site 
(admittedly this has potentially dangerous consequences). Not only attacks such CSRF show 
that it is possible to circumvent the same origin policy, but that policy blocks other 
functionalities, which could be useful. In the words of Douglas Crockford: “[The Same 
Origin Policy] allows dangerous things while preventing useful ones”. The way out of that 
dilemma may lie in a much more intelligent defense. 
In the case of CSRF, the proposed defenses are either in the website (alerting the system 
administrator that the website in its present design allows CSRF attacks) or in the client side. 
Typically the solutions suggested either reduce the functionality of the website, changes the 
protocol of trusted session by requiring more authentication, or (as is the case with request 
rodeo) offers a tool which limits partially the access to websites from the clients.  In other 
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words, the solutions tend to make the protocols safer by making them more cumbersome 
and the protection often involves a reduction of functionality, i.e. it goes exactly against the 
logic, which underlies the success of the internet. 
What and AI-based approach potentially offer is a way to address the multiple threats 
associated with cybersecurity, without having to rely on an increasing list of changing rules 
or security procedures for diagnostic and recovery procedures. If security tools were expert 
systems, which could not be abused as easily, the situation would be very different. Ideally 
they would understand what users are trying to do and make sure that this is what is 
happening. They would develop a sense of “situational awareness”, from which they would 
be able to tell malicious activity from legitimate ones. They would be able to make context 
dependent determinations. 
b. Prospects of AI in cybersecurity 
If AI means introducing intelligence in an automated system, there is no doubt that the 
future of cybersecurity lies in AI. But AI is at the same time an advanced field and at a very 
early stage of development. 
The limits of the possible with AI are not known. The limits of the capabilities of AI are a 
moving frontier. In a “post biological intelligence” world (P. Davies, 2010), the division 
between natural and artificial intelligence will be blurred. 
We are still far away from that world, but it is not too early to envision it. And the question 
is how should AI be introduced in the world of cybersecurity with maximum effect in the 
short term. Should we have a vision of AI-based cybersecurity as a cyber-equivalent of what 
happen with the immune system during biological evolution? I.e. of the creation over time 
of a large and complex organ inseparable from the rest of the organism? Should the first 
phase attempt to build the equivalent of a rudimentary immune system, with the vision of 
an eventual large and sophisticated one? Or should the search be more random and based 
on trying to introduce more intelligence in security tool whenever possible and wherever 
possible? In fact the two approaches differ only on paper. The immune system must have 
developed out of a random search as we are told the rest of biological evolution, leading in 
the long run to high levels of organization.  
To what extent does AI in its present state provide a framework to start building such a 
system? It is impossible and not useful here to try and describe a field like AI. On the one 
hand it is a large body of academic knowledge (Russel and Novig 2003).  When it comes to 
its applications, it looks more like a vast and fragmented field. Through expert systems AI 
has found applications in numerous fields from medical diagnosis to helping manufacture 
to finance management to fault analysis to advanced optimization, and to a too limited 
extent to cybersecurity. 
Of the many techniques used in AI, when it comes to anomaly-based intrusion detection the 
techniques, which seem the most natural are either “statistics” based (Mitchell 1997) or 
“knowledge-based”(Kerkar and Srinivas 2009).  
The whole area of machine learning tends to make heavy use of statistics. The a priori caveat 
with that kind of approach in the context of intrusion detection is the possibility that the 
problem (or curse) with false positive re-emerges. If it is possible to set-up the system in 
such a way it can “reason” probabilistically (Pearl 1988) about events along the lines of the 
iterative Bayesian updating described previously, this problem may turn out manageable. 
Statistically based machine learning traditionally needs huge amount of data. This may turn 
problematic in many situations of interest for intrusion detection.  
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This points to the fact that there are fundamental cognitive differences between human 
beings and machines. Human beings need much less data to “learn” than machines and get 
a better power of discrimination. One implication of that remark is to invalidate partially the 
assumption that what human beings can do, machines will also be able to do.   
Still an approach based on statistical learning in cybersecurity is not hopeless, quite the 
opposite. But this suggests that the best use of AI may not be to try to find a way to have 
machines replicating what human beings do. 
An alternative to statistical learning is Knowledge Based systems (KBS) (kerkhar, 2009), 
although that approach raises also challenging issues. KBS tends also to be specialized. The 
system can acquire its knowledge in a variety of ways. It can be made to learn. A lot rides on 
the way knowledge is stored and represented. Those systems can reason and make 
inferences. In principle they could be used to make autonomous determination of whether a 
malicious attack is unfolding.  
In practice in the case of web applications, for example, the information they have is what 
the browser sees: http requests, they can parse ad nauseam, website contents etc… One 
immediate challenge is to set up a knowledge base, which can make sense of such 
information. 
Other approaches used in AI may turn out quite powerful in cybersecurity. Intrusion 
detection has some features in common with problem solving. Techniques using formal 
logic and theorem proving may turn out to be quite useful. If it were possible to reformulate 
the problem of intrusion detection as solving a logical problem, we would know better what 
the limits of the possible are. 
As of now probabilistic reasoning seems to be the most natural and easiest way to introduce 
AI in intrusion detection, but this may not be the only one in the long run.  
In the context of cybersecurity, AI applications could take several forms. But it is clear that 
to be useful any AI will have to be used intensively. Even if the processing power of 
computers is increasing impressively, one has to be concerned by the potential CPU 
overhead associated with any intensive AI technique. Considering that there is hardly any 
alternative in the long run to AI in cybersecurity, one has to be prepared to see cybersecurity 
to be part of the rest of cyber in the same way as the immune system is part of the animal’s 
organisms. Instead of being a protection added at the end, it will be an integral part of the 
system, and as is the case with the immune system, it could be made “dual use”. I.e. its 
function may not be limited to protection.  
8. Conclusions 
Cybersecurity is a real challenge and the future of the internet partially depends on how 
that challenge is met. For a long time it has been clear that the cybersecurity response to the 
fast evolving threat needs to be much smarter than has been the case. The alternative is 
bound to lead to the situation predicted by Jonathan Zittrain [Zittrain 2008]: “If the 
problems associated with the Internet [...] are not addressed, a set of blunt solutions will 
likely be applied to solve problems at the expense of much of what we love about today’s 
information ecosystem”. 
This chapter focused on anomaly-based intrusion detection. But the role of AI in 
cybersecurity should not be seen as limited to that. Some cybersecurity problems needs 
urgent attention: for example the  BGP (Border Gateway Protocol). In that case as was the 
case with the DNS system, the origin of the problem has to do with authentication. It seems 
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that there is little that a human expert can do let alone an AI system without an 
authentication protocol. Today that means a cumbersome system of keys, which slows 
down everything and introduces new failure modes. Furthermore as we saw recently with 
MD5, encryption protocols get eventually broken. 
BGP does not have a system of authentication based on keys. It has no authentication system 
at all. It is vulnerable to any rogue routers. That is not sustainable. Eventually BGP may also 
use an authentication system based on keys, with the same negative consequences. A very 
nice scenario would be that AI could offer other ways toward authentication, which is one 
of the major basically unsolved problem in cybersecurity. 
There is an imperative to put far more artificial intelligence in cybersecurity. The question is 
how best to do it.  
Artificial intelligence is a vast and advanced field still relatively immature and definitely not 
optimized for cybersecurity. Specific work will be needed in artificial intelligence to 
facilitate its application to cybersecurity. Progress on that front will go faster if the 
possibility of applying AI techniques in cybersecurity inspires more interest to the AI 
community.  
Cybersecurity could turn out a very good field of application for AI. It has the computer to 
computer interaction dimension and some of the problem solving culture (Newel and Simon 
1972) developed in AI may find a natural area of application there.  
One obstacle to the development of the interface between the two communities (security 
and AI) is the way security world operates. In cybersecurity, there is no real repository of 
knowledge. The knowledge exists, there is a lot of it, but it is scattered and not codified. 
Instead of looking at AI to try and find some "tools" which could be applied directly to 
cybersecurity, security people should have a harder look at their field, to make it more easily 
penetrable to outsiders, like AI people. As long as the approach to security is organized 
around the specific of attacks and the defense consists in looking for ways to prevent them, 
through some tweaking of existing protocols or functionalities, this will not happen soon. A 
possibility would be to be able to develop some sense of "situational awareness" which 
could be communicated or inoculated to the AI based tools. 
AI systems and human beings differ in significant ways. The implications of those 
differences will be clearer when operational AI based tools become far more common in 
cybersecurity.  Although the limit of the possible in AI is really ill-defined, it exists.  
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themselves contain more additional interesting information: examples of a practical application and results
obtained for existing networks as well as results of experiments confirming efficacy of a synergistic analysis of
anomaly detection and signature detection, and application of interesting solutions, such as an analysis of the
anomalies of user behaviors and many others.
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